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From September 19, 1994, to March 31, 1995, the U.S. government 
intervened militarily in Haiti. Conducted under UN Security Coun-
cil Resolution 940 and Chapter VII of the UN Charter, Operation 
Uphold Democracy was the most convoluted military invasion in 
American history. Due to former president Jimmy Carter’s suc-
cessful last- minute negotiations with an illegal junta, President 
William J. Clinton turned around about one hundred aircraft and 
airborne troops twenty minutes before hostilities were set to com-
mence. Commanders and their units then prepared to enter the 
country peacefully, scrambling to switch from a war mentality to 
a peacekeeping mind- set overnight. Operational disorder ensued 
for weeks even as thousands of multinational forces and numerous 
agencies entered the country to advise and support Haiti’s fledg-
ling democratic government. With mission handover to the United 
Nations Mission in Haiti (UNMIH) on March 31, 1995, many U.S. 
troops departed while others donned blue berets to serve under UN 
command. For fifteen months, UNMIH troops, 40 percent of them 
from the United States, assisted Haitians and their government in 
furthering democracy before mission transfer to yet another UN 
force, the United Nations Support Mission in Haiti (UNSMIH).
The 1994 U.S.- led military intervention also allowed the U.S. 
Army major and Haitian American Anthony “Tony” Ladouceur 
to return to his native country. In 1967 Ladouceur left Haiti to 
spend his teenage years with relatives in New York City while his 
businessman father remained in Port- au- Prince. American citi-
zenship and an army enlistment led to a commission through offi-
cer candidate school. As a cultural advisor and translator for the 
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military intervention’s commander, Lt. Gen. Henry H. “Hugh” 
Shelton, the Haiti- born major was able to visit his father’s moun-
tainside home overlooking Port- au- Prince. “I will show you a pic-
ture of it,” he said. “He has a fifty- foot wall around it. He enters 
through three doors: a wooden door, a reinforced metal door, and 
then another metal door, both in the front and the back. All the 
windows have metal bars on them. He has a loaded shotgun and 
a strategic location in his house where he goes if something starts 
to happen. One of his neighbors was robbed and they killed his 
son in the house. He was hiding when they shot his son but then 
he came at them with a machete. They had Uzi submachine guns 
and they just wasted him.”1
Three weeks later Capt. Doni Colon, U.S. Army, arrived. His 
participation in the military intervention began with debarka-
tion at Port- au- Prince International Airport in October 1994. It 
was also his first exposure to the Western Hemisphere’s poor-
est country. While being transported to his headquarters, Colon 
witnessed an airport terminal controlled by heavily armed U.S. 
combat troops, throngs of Haitian pedestrians and street vendors 
conducting their affairs along dirt streets, and American infan-
trymen on foot patrol circumventing heaps of human waste and 
rotting garbage. While nearly vomiting from the stench, Colon 
observed Haitians “washing themselves by throwing a bucket into 
the sewer and bringing water out and also cleaning their clothes 
and stuff in that.” A subsequent safety briefing on AIDS increased 
Colon’s growing consternation about Haiti. “I was told that Hai-
tians do not believe that AIDS is really a disease. They believe it 
is done by someone to you. You can’t get it if protected by a par-
ticular voodoo [vodun] religious spell. They might make a little 
charm or do a saying at home to protect them and it is the same 
with many diseases here. They just do not understand the science, 
the reality of it. To them, it is magic and superstition.” After less 
than twenty- four hours in country, Colon grimly stated, “This 
place is in trouble.”2
This book is about Ladouceur, Colon, and others like them who 
served during Operation Uphold Democracy and UNMIH from 
Buy the Book
Introduction | xv
1994 to 1996. It is an oral history of the two military interventions, 
as told by the men and women who personally experienced them. 
Because it is concerned with military incursions from a personal 
viewpoint, this study asks a straightforward but important ques-
tion: What happens to the military men and women who plan 
and execute military interventions and the civilians who observe 
them firsthand?
In a contemporary sense, military intervention as a form of pre-
ventive diplomacy began on June 17, 1992, six months after the 
Cold War ended, when UN secretary- general Boutros Boutros- 
Ghali submitted his Security Council report entitled An Agenda 
for Peace: Preventive Diplomacy, Peacemaking, and Peacekeeping.” 
In it he articulated his vision for the UN in resolving post– Cold 
War conflicts peacefully. To the secretary- general, the ideologi-
cal struggle between the West and the East had terminated but 
various population groups now threatened international peace 
through “new claims of nationalism and sovereignty.” To “remove 
sources of danger before violence resulted,” he reiterated that the 
UN Charter’s Chapter VI allowed for peaceful intervention in inter-
national disputes. In the absence of a nonviolent solution, how-
ever, Chapter VII and Article 42 permitted a UN armed force to 
maintain international peace and security. Through preventive 
diplomacy, peacemaking, peacekeeping, or postconflict peace-
building, the UN members’ judicious application of the charter’s 
authority and appropriate use of military force would “address 
the deepest causes of conflict: economic despair, social injustice, 
and political oppression.”3
In the early 1990s Haiti certainly met the criteria for a UN mil-
itary intervention under Chapter VI or Chapter VII. But the use of 
armed troops to intervene in places such as the island of Hispan-
iola has generated considerable debate. Historically, intervention 
to end human suffering is traceable to St. Augustine and Thomas 
Aquinas and Christian theories of “just war.” More recently, Andrea 
Kathryn Talentino’s Military Intervention after the Cold War: The 
Evolution of Theory and Practice (2005) represents those who doubt 
its usefulness. In the case of Haiti, Talentino concludes that armed 
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intervention accomplished little because the effort was far too 
limited in scope and reflected a “one and done” attitude of get in 
and get out. In truth, Maj. Robert B. Geddis, U.S. Army, verified 
her point by remarking, “I kind of took to Haiti that it is a problem 
that they got to work out. We are here to help; let’s do our job and 
then leave.” Richard N. Haass, in Intervention: The Use of Ameri-
can Military Force in the Post– Cold War World (1999) also questions 
the value of military interventions to alleviate human suffering. 
His book offers recommendations for decision makers to consider 
when determining whether to intervene. Glenn J. Antizzo’s U.S. 
Military Intervention in the Post– Cold War Era: How to Win Amer-
ica’s Wars in the Twenty- First Century (2013) advocates for mili-
tary interventions as long as objectives are clearly defined, public 
support is secured, and decision makers have the will to use force 
when necessary.4
These important studies take an argumentative stance to weigh 
the merits and drawbacks of intervening or offer an advisory per-
spective intended to sway policy makers. Noticeably absent from 
1. The face of military intervention: a wary U.S. soldier canvasses the Port- 
au- Prince streets. Source: Department of Defense.
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the existing literature is an attentive examination of military inter-
ventions from the standpoint of those who actually plan and exe-
cute them “on the ground.”
To address that deficiency, this book uses oral histories to dis-
close the personal experiences of general officers, commanders, 
staff officers, noncommissioned officers, and others involved in 
Operation Uphold Democracy and UNMIH. Their insights speak 
to strategic, operational, and tactical planning considerations, 
intelligence gathering, multinational force interaction, mission 
execution conundrums, communications and language concerns, 
ethnic and cultural factors, and other topics. Collectively, they 
shed valuable light on what it actually means to intervene mili-
tarily in the affairs of others.
The oral histories used here resulted from a chief of staff of the 
army directive to produce a history of the service’s role in Oper-
ation Uphold Democracy. From 1994 until 1999 I led a research 
team as a regular army lieutenant colonel and faculty member 
assigned to the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College 
(CGSC), Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. Professors Robert F. Bau-
mann and John T. Fishel, along with U.S. Army reservists and 
CGSC students, also conducted interviews. We followed guide-
lines within the U.S. Army’s Center of Military History publica-
tion Oral History: Techniques and Procedures. Department of the 
Army regulations for documenting ongoing military operations 
and distributing public information about them guided our efforts. 
Military participants released their oral histories as government 
employees and public servants. Nongovernment civilians also 
agreed to public release, as concerned citizens. The unclassified 
interview records are within the public domain and accessible 
through the Combined Arms Research Library archives at Fort 
Leavenworth, Kansas.5
The reasons why the UN and the U.S. government would inter-
vene militarily in Haiti are complex and understanding them 
requires revisiting Haiti’s position within international circles 
and in relation to the United States. The island of Hispaniola is 
strategically important, for it is but 1,530 miles from UN head-
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quarters in New York to Haiti’s capital, Port- au- Prince, equivalent 
to the distance from Los Angeles, California, to Topeka, Kan-
sas. Haiti is also 690 miles off the U.S. coast, equal to the driving 
distance from Chicago, Illinois, to Washington DC. Soon after 
Jean- Bertrand Aristide’s ouster in 1991, the UN secretary- general 
encouraged the formation of the UN Group of Friends of Haiti, 
a political, economic, and diplomatic assistance body including 
Argentina, Brazil, Canada, Chile, France, Guatemala, Peru, the 
United States, and Uruguay. U.S. membership has much to do 
with national security because of unlawful immigration and Hai-
ti’s role as an illegal drug conduit through which tons of cocaine 
enters America annually. Stopping illegal immigrants and coun-
tering Haitian drug smuggling composes a significant portion of 
U.S. counterdrug operations and expenditures.6
Once considered the “pearl of the Antilles,” Haiti is the poor-
est Western Hemisphere country, with a 10 percent adult liter-
acy rate. Only 50 percent of Haitian children attend school. The 
country ranks among the ten least- educated nations globally, with 
the other nine located in Africa. The relatively few educated Hai-
tians are typically wealthy and attended foreign universities. They 
often become expats, leaving their country for the United States 
and other locales, such as Canada.
Haiti’s loss of educated citizens creates a national “brain drain” 
as well as a substantial diaspora in many countries. The 2010 U.S. 
Census reported 975,000 Haitian Americans, concentrated in Flor-
ida, New York, New Jersey, Massachusetts, Kentucky, Louisiana, 
Delaware, and Wisconsin. There are prominent Haitian American 
judges, lawyers, politicians, military officers, entertainers, busi-
nessmen and businesswomen, artists, musicians, and models in 
the United States, as well as the 1991 Miss America and numerous 
professional athletes. Haitian Americans send millions of dollars 
to their relatives in Haiti each year.
Although the relationship between Haiti and North America is 
well established, surprisingly little has been published about Oper-
ation Uphold Democracy and UNMIH. John R. Ballard’s Upholding 
Democracy: The United States Military Campaign in Haiti, 1994– 
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1997 (1998) conveys his personal views as a member of U.S. Atlan-
tic Command’s Joint Analysis and Assessment Team in Haiti and 
Norfolk, Virginia. His work is chronological and sophisticated 
and includes some participant interview material. A book I coau-
thored with Baumann and Fishel, Invasion, Intervention, “Inter-
vasion”: A Concise History of the U.S. Army in Operation Uphold 
Democracy (1998), was published by the U.S. Army’s Command 
and General Staff College Press and focused on army operations 
in Haiti. Additional works include Bob Shacochis’s The Immacu-
late Invasion (1999), an excellent personal story of an imbedded 
journalist with U.S. Special Forces units in Haiti. Stan Goff’s Hid-
eous Dream: A Soldier’s Memoir of the U.S. Invasion of Haiti (2000) 
is another personal account. Lawrence E. Casper’s Falcon Bri-
gade: Combat and Command in Somalia and Haiti (2001) offers 
insights into military intervention operational and tactical deci-
sion making. Ralph Pezzullo’s Plunging into Haiti: Clinton, Aris-
tide, and the Defeat of Diplomacy (2006) and Philippe Girard’s 
Clinton in Haiti: The 1994 U.S. Invasion of Haiti (2004) offer superb 
general histories of Haiti and cover specific events leading up 
to the military intervention and afterward. How the local popu-
lace engages UN peacekeepers is covered in Béatrice Pouligny’s 
Peace Operations Seen from Below: UN  Missions and Local People 
(2006). Several complementary works highlight the two inter-
ventions through the lenses of U.S. and Haitian economic, gov-
ernment, humanitarian, political, military, or social issues. They 
include Amnesty International’s On the Horns of a Dilemma: Mili-
tary Repression or Foreign Invasion? (1994); Charles Arthur’s, After 
the Dance: Haiti: One Year after the Invasion (1995); and Karen 
von Hippel’s, Democracy by Force: U.S. Military Intervention in the 
Post– Cold War World (2000). The UN  Security Council: From the 
Cold War to the 21st Century, edited by David M. Malone (2004), 
includes a comprehensive chapter on the Security Council’s role in 
the Haitian intervention. Capacity Building for Peacekeeping: The 
Case of Haiti, edited by John T. Fishel and Andrés Sáenz (2007); 
Ronald H. Cole, Mission to Haiti: Direction and Support of Peace-
keeping and Humanitarian Operations, 1994– 2000 (2008); and 
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Aaron L. Wilkins, The Civil Military Operations Center in Oper-
ation Uphold Democracy (2012) are valuable for deducing practi-
cal “lessons learned.” All of these studies assist in understanding 
the military intervention in Haiti.
This book adds to the body of work on military interventions 
in several ways. It illustrates how oral history assists in explain-
ing past events. Those interested in foreign relations and military 
history should find it useful for what it says about executive policy 
becoming operational reality. The work further illuminates what 
happens to men and women in uniform when ordered into harm’s 
way. Maj. Gen. Joseph W. Kinzer, U.S. Army, the commanding 
general of UNMIH, explained in his interview why the Haiti mil-
itary intervention is a worthwhile study: “You should look at this 
and think about having to do something like it.” Before taking 
Kinzer’s advice, however, it is necessary to give some thought to 
military intervention in light of how Haiti’s people have histori-
cally viewed the use of military power.7
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